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Abstract
We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by using
the voting record of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. Members
with more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,
which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future inter-
est rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information not
available to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they may
exaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimal
committee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, but
needs to manage career concerns.
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1 Introduction
A large fraction of countries now set monetary policy via independent committees of
experts.1 While there are substantial literatures on why central bank independence is
important for macroeconomic stability and committees outperform individuals, how to
best design a monetary policy committee is a more open question. One important unre-
solved issue is whether committees should include outside experts who are not full-time
employees of the central bank. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank in the US and
the Riksbank in Sweden use committees composed solely of bank employees, while the
Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is made up of five Bank execu-
tives (so-called internal members) and four outside experts (so-called external members).
According to the Bank of England (2010a), the purpose of external appointments is to
“ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise in addition to that gained
inside the Bank of England.” This paper aims to assess the extent to which the inclusion
of external members achieves this goal.
In order to measure a member’s private information, we first construct a model in
which the realization of an unknown state variable determines whether the correct decision
is a low or high interest rate. The model predicts a member’s vote as a function of (1)
the prior probability that the high state occurred; (2) the member’s monetary policy
philosophy or preferences; and (3) the precision of the private information that a member
receives about the state. We show that if a member has a more dovish monetary policy
than another (i.e., he believes high inflation to be less likely), then he will tend to vote
for lower rates no matter the value of the prior. In contrast, if a member has more private
information than another, then he will tend to vote for the high rate more often when
the prior favors the low state and for the low rate more often when the prior favors the
high state; informally speaking, he is less likely to “follow the crowd”.
To use the model to distinguish empirically a member’s philosophy from his expertise,
we construct a proxy for the prior distribution in each period with survey data that asks
financial institutions in the City of London to state how likely they consider different
interest rate movements. Our claim is that the average view of the market should accu-
rately reflect all public sources of information about economic shocks. We then use this
proxy variable along with members’ observed votes to structurally estimate our model’s
philosophy and expertise parameters for internal and external members.2
1Pollard (2004) reports that ninety percent of eighty-eight surveyed central banks use committees to
decide interest rates.
2We treat internal and external members as homogeneous groups; nevertheless, we report Monte Carlo
results that show that our estimator accurately measures the difference in group means when there is
within-group heterogeneity.
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Our baseline result is that external members have significantly more precise private
information than internals.3 Our interpretation is that external members have different—
as opposed to more—information than internal members since internals’ view on economic
conditions is more likely reflected in the market’s beliefs (i.e. more likely to be public
information) than externals’. This supports the idea that external members bring a
unique perspective the MPC that helps broaden the expertise on which UK monetary
policy is based.
We then examine whether changes in expertise drive the voting dynamics identified
in Hansen and McMahon (2008) which notes growing conflict in terms of average vote
levels between internals and externals. Our finding is that there are no significant shifts in
expertise levels over time. However, there is a large philosophical shift towards dovishness
among experienced external members; this is a result of independent behavioral interest.
While our baseline results point towards externals having substantial private informa-
tion, a well-established career concerns literature emphasizes that experts will exaggerate
their private information if they care about acquiring a reputation for expertise.4 The
paper therefore examines whether a particular type of reputational incentive might drive
the baseline finding: the desire for reappointment. We make use of a quasi-natural
experiment that exogenously reduced the probability that external members would be
reappointed during a particular era, and find that inexperienced external members serv-
ing in this era receive private signals with an estimated standard deviation over three
times larger than other inexperienced externals.5 Further evidence of career concerns is
that non-academic externals show more precise private information at the beginning of
their tenure than at the end. These results indicate that at least some of the estimated
informational advantage of external members may be an artifact of career concerns. Ca-
reer concerns also appear to influence the degree of philosophical divergence: external
members’ philosophies shift less when reappointment is more salient and when they are
non-academics.
We view these results as being of interest in contexts beyond monetary policy because
the debate about whether to include outsiders on committees is currently occurring in
several areas, and the reasoning of those in favor is remarkably similar to that of the Bank.
3We also find that external have a significantly more dovish philosophy than internal members. This
confirms the findings of an existing literature that examines internal-external differences on the MPC
(Gerlach-Kristen 2003, Bhattacharjee and Holly 2005, Spencer 2006, Besley, Meads, and Surico 2008,
Harris and Spencer 2008) in terms of preferences and finds external members tend to be more dovish.
None of these paper consider heterogeneity in private information
4Trueman (1994), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Levy (2004) establish this result for an individual
decision maker, while Levy (2007) and Visser and Swank (2007) explore the idea in the context of
committees.
5We focus on inexperienced externals because the career concerns literature predicts that reputational
incentives are strongest for new agents.
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For example, the Food and Drug Administration in the US uses advisory committees
formed largely of outside experts to vote on whether new drugs should be allowed to
market. According to the FDA, “an academician or a practitioner representative uses
his or her expert knowledge to provide state-of-the-art advice on scientific issues under
deliberation.” In the field of corporate governance, some argue that the inclusion of
non-executive directors (outside directors without managerial responsibility) on boards
should be adopted as a basic tenet of corporate governance. Higgs (2003) writes that “a
major contribution of the non-executive director is to bring wider experience and a fresh
perspective to the boardroom.”6 In both of these cases, the informational advantages of
including outsiders is clearly at the heart of the argument.
Since our empirical setting features internal and external experts repeatedly taking
observable policy decisions on the same technical issue, it is also useful for addressing
the general question of what outsiders bring to a committee since data is not available in
the above-mentioned contexts.7 We believe ours is the first paper to show that externals
have non-trivial private information, and this supports their inclusion in decision-making
bodies. At the same time, our results on career concerns show that agency problems can
also arise, meaning that committee designers should take care in arranging the institu-
tional details of externals’ participation. Nevertheless, we view our paper as providing a
qualified “yes” to the question of whether committees can benefit from a mixed compo-
sition.
2 The Monetary Policy Committee
This section describes the institutional details of the MPC. Until 1997 the Chancellor of
the Exchequer (the government official in charge of the Treasury) had sole responsibility
for setting interest rates in the UK. One of Gordon Brown’s first actions on becoming
Chancellor in the government of Tony Blair was to set up an independent committee, the
MPC, for setting interest rates. Its remit, as defined in the Bank of England Act (1998)
is to “maintain price stability, and subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her
Majesty’s government, including its objectives for growth and employment.” In practice,
6Higgs (2003) goes on to write that
Ensuring that the board as a whole has an appropriate mix of skills and experience is
essential for it to be an effective decision-making body. There is no standard board or
standard non-executive director, nor can there be. It is the range of skills and attributes
acquired through a diversity of experiences and backgrounds that combine to create a
cohesive and effective board.
7For example, individual level votes from corporate board meetings are typically kept secret.
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the committee seeks to achieve a target inflation rate of 2%,8 based on the Consumer
Price Index. If inflation is greater than 3% or less than 1%, the Governor of the Bank
of England must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why. The inflation
target is symmetric; missing the target in either direction is treated with equal concern.
The MPC first convened on 6 June 1997, and has met every month since. Throughout
the paper we analyze the MPC voting records between June 1997 and March 2009,9 the
point at which the main focus of the decision (temporarily) shifted to asset purchase
decisions related to quantitative easing. Before June 1998 there is information about
whether members preferred higher or lower interest rates compared with the decision,
but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we treat a member’s vote as
either 25 basis points higher or lower than the decision, in the direction of disagreement.
We also gathered background information for each member from press releases associated
with their appointment and from information provided to the Treasury Select Committee
ahead of their confirmation from which we gather information on whether the member
was an academic appointment to the MPC.
The MPC has nine members; five of these come from within the Bank of England:
the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and the Executive Director
for Markets. The Chancellor also appoints four members (subject to approval from the
Treasury Select Committee) from outside the Bank. There are no restrictions on who can
serve as an external member. Bar the governors, all members serve three year terms; the
governors serve five year terms. When members’ terms end, they can either be replaced
or re-appointed. Table 1 lists the members that served on the MPC during our sample,
whether they are internal or external, the period in which they served, and whether they
joined the committee directly from an academic position. Our sample contains a total
of 13 internal and 14 external members, with academics making up around one third of
members.
Each member is independent in the sense that they do not represent any interest group
or faction. The Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of interest that
they feel is most likely to achieve the inflation target,10 and majority vote determines
8This target changed from the RPIX to the CPI measure of inflation in January 2004, with a reduction
in the inflation target from 2.5% to 2%.
9The data are available from the Bank of England (2010b). We use each regular MPC meeting in this
period but we drop from the dataset the (unanimous) emergency meeting held after September 11th.
10According to the Bank of England (2010a)
Each member of the MPC has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy.
Members are not chosen to represent individual groups or areas. They are independent.
Each member of the Committee has a vote to set interest rates at the level they believe is
consistent with meeting the inflation target. The MPC’s decision is made on the basis of
one-person, one vote. It is not based on a consensus of opinion. It reflects the votes of each
individual member of the Committee.
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Table 1: MPC Members
Member Type Tenure Academic
Howard Davies INT 06/97 - 07/97 N
Edward George INT 06/97 - 06/03 N
Mervyn King INT 06/97 - 03/09 N
Ian Plenderleith INT 06/97 - 05/02 N
David Clementi INT 11/97 - 08/02 N
John Vickers INT 06/98 - 11/00 Y
Charles Bean INT 10/00 - 03/09 Y
Paul Tucker INT 06/02 - 03/09 N
Andrew Large INT 11/02 - 01/06 N
Rachel Lomax INT 07/03 - 06/08 N
John Gieve INT 01/06 - 03/09 N
Spencer Dale INT 07/08 - 03/09 N
Paul Fisher INT 03/09 - 03/09 N
Willem Buiter EXT 06/97 - 05/00 Y
Charles Goodhart EXT 06/97 - 05/00 Y
DeAnne Julius EXT 11/97 - 05/01 N
Alan Budd EXT 12/97 - 05/99 N
Sushil Wadhwani EXT 06/99 - 05/02 N
Christopher Allsopp EXT 06/00 - 05/03 Y
Stephen Nickell EXT 06/00 - 05/06 Y
Kate Barker EXT 06/01 - 03/09 N
Marian Bell EXT 06/02 - 06/05 N
Richard Lambert EXT 06/03 - 03/06 N
David Walton EXT 07/05 - 06/06 N
Tim Besley EXT 06/06 - 03/09 Y
David Blanchflower EXT 06/06 - 03/09 Y
Andrew Sentance EXT 10/06 - 03/09 N
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the outcome. Consistent with its one-person one-vote philosophy, the MPC displays
substantial dissent. 64% of the 142 meetings in the sample have at least one deviation
from the committee majority. Figure 1 shows the level of interest rates that the MPC
has implemented, the votes of each member around this, and highlights the periods of
interest rate loosening.11 Figure 2 shows how many votes were cast in each meeting in
opposition to the final decision. Within the set of non-unanimous meetings, 5-4 and 6-3
decisions are not uncommon.
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Figure 1: Votes and Decisions
The MPC meets on the first Wednesday and Thursday of each month. In the month
between meetings, members receive numerous briefings from Bank staff and regular up-
dates of economic indicators. On the Friday before MPC meetings, members gather for
a half-day meeting in which they are given the latest analysis of economic and busi-
ness trends. Then on Wednesday members discuss their views on several issues. The
discussion continues on Thursday morning, when each member is given some time to
summarize his or her views to the rest of the MPC and to suggest what vote they favor
(although they can, if they wish, wait to hear the others views before committing to
a vote (Lambert 2006)). This process begins with the Deputy Governor for monetary
11The loosening cycle is defined as the period from the first cut in interest rates until the next increase
in interest rate.
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Figure 2: Deviations
policy and concludes with the Governor, but the order for the others is not fixed. To
formally conclude the meeting, the Governor suggests an interest rate that he believes
will command a majority. Each member then chooses whether to agree with the Gov-
ernor’s decision, or dissent and state an alternative interest rate. The MPC decision is
announced at noon, and two weeks after each meeting, members’ votes are published as
part of otherwise unattributed minutes.
3 Model
We now lay out a model that captures the basic elements of MPC voting and that will
serve as the basis of our empirical analysis.12 In period t voter i must choose a vote
vit ∈ {0, 1} where 0 represents the lower of two possible rate changes and 1 the higher.13
The restriction that a vote must take one of two values is not as restrictive as it might
first appear since there are three distinct votes in only 7 of the 142 meetings in our sample
12We model voting along the lines of the jury literature. Early references are Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998); a more recent survey is Gerling, Gruner, Kiel, and Schulte
(2005).
13We do not attempt to model the two rates over which voting occurs; recent work on this issue of
agenda setting on MPC’s is found in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010).
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and in no meeting are there four or more distinct votes.
Member i’s payoffs over votes and states of the world is given by
u(vit) =
1 if ωt − (1− θ) > 0 and vit = 1; or if ωt − (1− θ) < 0 and vit = 00 if ωt − (1− θ) > 0 and vit = 0; or if ωt − (1− θ) < 0 and vit = 1. (1)
Members’ utility depends on ωt− (1− θ) which we can think of as a measure of inflation-
ary pressues in the economy. As the extent of inflationary pressures is greater (lesser),
the member will derive utility by voting for the higher (lower) interest rate. Inflation-
ary pressures depend on an unknown state variable ωt ∈ {0, 1} that reflects economic
conditions relevant to inflation such as demand shocks or, as in Gerlach-Kristen (2006),
the output gap of the economy. We assume that members have a prior belief qt that the
high state prevails. One can think of qt as reflecting the conventional wisdom or average
view of the market about the probability the economy is in the high state. Members also
have their own assessment of economic conditions that we model as the realization of a
private signal sit ∼ N(ωt, σ2it). Member i forms the belief that the high state occurred
via Bayesian updating, yielding
ω̂(sit) = Pr [ω = 1 | sit ] = qtf1(sit)
qtf1(sit) + (1− qt)f0(sit) . (2)
where f1 ∼ (1, σ2it) is the distribution of sit conditional on ωt = 1 and f0 ∼ (0, σ2it) is the
distribution of sit conditional on ωt = 0. We refer to σit as expertise because it reflects
how much additional information member i has above and beyond conventional wisdom.
Rather than interpreting sit as additional data (as pointed out by Blinder (2007a), MPC
members have access to the same economic data relevant to inflation), we interpret it as
that part of a member’s viewpoint on the implications of the data for inflation that is not
already incorporated into standard thinking.14 A member with no expertise (σ2it = ∞)
will always hold the same beliefs as the conventional wisdom (ω̂(sit) = qt ∀sit) while a
member with more expertise will in general hold beliefs that diverge from conventional
wisdom. This view of σit as expertise corresponds to the notion of expertise aquired
outside central banking as referred to by the Bank of England (and as discussed above).
Inflationary pressures also depend on θ ∈ (0, 1), an unknown parameter that reflects
14For example, in the lead-up to the recent financial crisis, all MPC members had the same access
to financial market data, but some argue that its implications were not fully understood by the Bank
of England. Former external member Sushil Wadhwani claims that “little was done (by the Bank) to
deal with the bubble, despite public concerns about excessive risk taking...In my time at the MPC at
the bank, I was surprised by the lack of interest in issues relating to financial markets” (Bloomberg
Businessweek 2010b). In our model, a member that recognized that financial market data boded poorly
for future economic growth when the majority view did not would have expertise.
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uncertainty about the transmission mechanism or, more generally, the model that maps
interest rate decisions into inflation outcomes at time t.15 Unlike with ωt, members do
not receive information about θ; they simply have beliefs θit at time t on its magnitude.
Alternatively, one could simply view θit as a preference parameter reflecting how much
evidence member i needs that the high interest rate is needed before voting for it (or, in the
language of jury models, his or her “burden of proof” (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998)).
Because the θ parameter has multiple interpretations, we will simply refer to it as a
member’s economic philosophy. In line with the standard terminology in the monetary
literature, we define a member as a dove if θit < 0.5, a neutral if θit = 0.5, and a hawk if
θit > 0.5.
An important assumption is that agents’ utilities depend on their votes rather than
the committee decision. This is a way of imposing a sincere voting behavioral assump-
tion. In many voting models agents behave strategically, meaning they incorporate the
information conveyed by other members’ strategies in their voting decisions. Here, they
vote for whichever interest rate maximizes their expected utility only conditioning on
their own information. Solving and estimating a model of strategic voting would be dif-
ficult. First, members vote sequentially rather than simultaneously. Even if we could
observe the order in which MPC voting occurred (which we cannot), a strategic voting
model would have multiple equilibria and arguably limited predictive value. Moreover,
Gerlach-Kristen (2004) finds evidence that markets react to dissenting votes by adjusting
the yield curve, which itself impacts on inflation. So, unlike in standard voting models,
MPC members would have to condition on all possible vote configurations, not simply
the ones in which they are pivotal for the decision. Solving for the equilibria of this game
would be a challenge for us, and certainly for the MPC members. The sincere voting
assumption attributes to MPC members a straightforward rule of thumb for reacting to
their information and allows for a clean empirical analysis.
Member i votes for the high rate if and only if ω̂(sit) ≥ 1 − θit, which, after some
algebraic manipulations,16 implies that he votes for the high rate if and only if
15There is a large literature on model uncertainty in monetary economics starting with the seminal
contribution of Brainard (1967).
16
ω̂(sit) ≥ θit ⇔ qt
qt + (1− qt) f0(sit)f1(sit)
≥ 1− θit ⇔ θit
1− θit
qt
1− qt ≥
f0(sit)
f1(sit)
Taking logs on both sides of the final inequality gives that member i votes high if and only if
ln
(
θit
1− θit
qt
1− qt
)
≥ − 1
2σ2it
s2it +
1
2σ2it
(s2it − 2sit + 1),
from which expression (3) derives.
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sit ≥ s∗it =
1
2
− σ2it ln
(
θit
1− θit
qt
1− qt
)
. (3)
Gathering these observations establishes the following result.
Proposition 1
v(sit) =
1 if sit ≥ s∗it0 if sit < s∗it.
Because the normal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, a higher
realization of sit gives more evidence that a high state occurred. So, voters adopt a cutoff
rule that calls on them to vote for the high rate if and only if the realization of their signal
crosses the threshold s∗it.
17 When this threshold increases, the probability of observing
vit = 1 decreases since it becomes less likely that sit will take on sufficiently high values
to justify implementing the higher rate.18
3.1 Philosophy versus expertise
Our hypothesis of interest is how external and internal members compare in terms of
expertise, but uncovering this difference is complicated by the fact that members also
potentially differ in terms of philosophy. Thus it is crucial to understand how differing
in term of expertise is empirically distinguishable from differing in terms of philosophy.
Suppose first that σ2it increases. The associated change in s
∗
it is
∂s∗it
∂σ2it
= − ln
(
θit
1− θit
qt
1− qt
)
S 0 ⇐⇒ qt R 1− θit. (4)
A higher σ2it means that the prior belief qt will be more influential in determining member
i’s vote. If qt favors the high state, member i will vote for the high rate more often; when
qt favors the low state, he votes for the low rate more often. Intuitively speaking, if a
member has less expertise, he becomes more likely to “follow the crowd”. If conventional
wisdom says that rates should be high, he votes high more often; if it says rates should
be low, he votes low more often. In the limit as σit → ∞, the member becomes totally
unresponsive to his signal and votes high if and only if qt ≥ 1 − θit. It is important to
17We use a normal distribution for signals rather than the more common Bernoulli distribution so that
the log-likelihood function that generates the voting data is continuous in the underlying parameters.
18 To see this more formally, observe that the probability of voting for the higher rate is
qt
(
1− Φ
(
s∗it − 1
σit
))
+ (1− qt)
(
1− Φ
(
s∗it
σit
))
where Φ is the standard normal cdf. Differentiating with respect to s∗it gives the result.
10
stress that even if two members have the same philosophy, they will still exhibit conflict if
their expertise levels differ. The member with more expertise will vote for systematically
higher (lower) rates than the member with less expertise when their prior beliefs are low
(high).
Now suppose that θit increases. The associated change in s
∗
it is
∂s∗it
∂θit
= −σ2it ln
(
qt
1− qt
)
1
θit(1− θit) < 0. (5)
When a member becomes more hawkish, he requires less evidence that a high shock
occurred to vote for the high rate. So independently of his prior belief, he becomes more
likely to vote for high rates. If two member have the same level of expertise but differ in
terms of philosophy, then the more hawkish member votes for systematically higher rates
for all values of prior beliefs.
One can summarize the preceding discussion with the result that
Proposition 2 When σ2it increases, the probability that member i chooses vit = 1 in-
creases if and only if qt > 1 − θit; when θit increases, the probability that member i
chooses vit = 1 increases for all qt.
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Figure 3: Distinguishing Information and Preferences
The bottom line is that differences in expertise and differences in philosophy are both
independent sources of voting disagreement, but how this disagreement expresses itself
depends on prior beliefs. One can visualize the difference in figure 3, which plots the
probability of voting for the high rate for different values of the prior. An increase in σ
induces a rotation in the predicted probability, while an increase in θ induces a shift.
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4 Econometric Methodology
Our model generates the likelihood function Lit that member i votes for the high rates
in time t as
Lit =
qt
(
1− Φ
(
s∗it−1
σit
))
+ (1− qt)Φ
(
1−
(
s∗it
σit
))
if D(High Vote)it = 1
qtΦ
(
s∗it−1
σit
)
+ (1− qt)Φ
(
s∗it
σit
)
if D(High Vote)it = 0
(6)
where D(High Vote)it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if vit = 1. If one could observe
qt and D(High Vote)it,
19 one can take this likelihood function directly to the data to
estimate expertise and philosophy. Before doing so, one must address two theoretical
challenges.
The first is that one could obviously never separately identify θ and σ parameters
for each member in each period. Instead, we assume that these parameters are constant
within subgroups of voters and compare differences across subgroups either by running
our estimator on a restricted sample or by allowing the θ and σ parameters to depend
linearly on categorical variables. We show, using a Monte Carlo exercise, that assuming
within-group homogeneity in the presence of within-group heterogeneity does not bias
the estimates of the group mean.
The second difficulty in implementing the estimator is that the likelihood function
is nearly flat for large and small values of qt when σ is large. When σ increases, the
probability of voting for the high rate as a function of qt approaches a step function as
figure 4 shows. This implies that our maximum likelihood estimator will have difficulty
converging when qt takes on extreme values. We detail below how we address this issue.
4.1 Constructing prior beliefs
In spite of these theoretical challenges, the main estimation difficulty is that we do not
observe qt and D(High Vote)it. Instead we use a Reuters survey that is carried out just
before each MPC meeting to construct a proxy measure for the prior, which we will call
q̂t, and for D(High Vote)it, which we will call D̂(High Vote)it.
20 The survey asks around
19Although we can observe a member’s vote, in periods with unanimous voting it is not clear whether
the alternative under consideration was higher or lower. Thus we do not observe D(High Vote)it directly.
20As Reuters did not have the survey results stored in their database, they were unable (or unwilling)
to provide the data for us. Instead, we have been able to collate copies of the survey results for most
periods in the sample; the 8 exceptions are February 2000, March 2000, October 2003, December 2005,
September 2007, October 2007, November 2007, and July 2008. In addition, we are unable to use the
data for periods April 2000, August 2008, and November 2008 (details of why not are in the appendix).
This leaves 131 out of the 142 sample periods in which we can construct market beliefs, although these
meetings do not get dropped from the sample as the methodology outlined below allows us to fill in these
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Figure 4: The Probability of Voting for the High Interest Rate
30-50 market economists from financial institutions in the City of London to predict the
outcome of MPC voting by writing a probability distribution over possible interest rates
choices. Because of the fairly large cross-sectional sample size and the prominence of the
participating institutions, the average beliefs in the survey data can be taken as a good
measure of conventional wisdom. The biggest problem with the survey is that it asks
respondents about their beliefs about what will—as opposed to what should—happen in
MPC meetings. To answer the survey question accurately, respondents would have to use
their beliefs about economic conditions, along with their beliefs about the philosophy and
information of members, to compute the probability of different configurations of MPC
votes. We believe that it is unlikely that they go through this process and more plausible
that they predict what the committee will do based on what they themselves would do
if they were committee members.
In periods with two votes we set q̂t equal to the average probability placed on the higher
rate over the total average probability placed on both rates and D̂(High Vote)it = 1 if
and only if member i voted for the higher of the two rates. In periods with one vote, we
identify the two rates on which the market places the highest average probability, and
set q̂t equal to the average probability placed on the higher rate over the total average
probability placed on both rates. We set D̂(High Vote)it = 1 if and only if member i
voted for the higher of the two identified rates.
missing values, though dropping them does not alter our empirical results.
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Table 2: Example of Survey Data
+50bps +25bps 0 -25bps -50bps
UBS 15% 80% 5%
Goldman Sachs 20% 75% 5%
JP Morgan 45% 45% 10%
AIB 15% 85%
Average 23.75% 71.25% 5%
Table 2 illustrates an example of the survey. The two outcomes with the highest
average probability are a rise of 50 basis points and a rise of 25 basis points. So, if
we observed a unanimous vote of +25, our proxy measure for the prior would be q̂t =
23.75
23.75+71.25
= 0.25 and we would set D̂(High Vote)it = 0 for all members. In fact the survey
data has somewhat different formats for different periods within our sample and in some
cases respondents were not able to write their beliefs over a full probability distribution.
In these cases we follow a slightly different methodology, but the construction is similar.
Appendix A contains the full details of the construction in all periods, including how we
treated anomalies in the data.
Of course, q̂t is not a perfect measure of the unobservable qt; we acknowledge it
is simply a proxy and it is subject to measurement error. For example, the survey
respondents predict the outcome of MPC meetings rather than what should be done.
Also, the respondents, even answering in the week of the decision, may not have exposure
to the full set of economic indicators that will be available to the MPC; the committee
is regularly given advance access to data that will only be released subsequently to the
wider public, and the information about the MPC’s own quarterly forecast is not known
by the market respondents until the middle of the month in which it is published (about
2 weeks after the decision). As such, they may not form the correct beliefs about the
implications for monetary policy from economic data, or may simply not carefully consider
their responses. In order to try to purge our proxy variable of some the noise related to
these concerns, we run the regression
ln
(
q̂t
1− q̂t
)
= αq + βq · fMPCt + εt
where fMPCt is the fraction of period t votes on the MPC in favor of the high rate. For
example, if the MPC split 6-3 for the high rate, fMPCt =
6
9
≈ 0.66. This regression
predicts the market’s beliefs if it could observe the realized split of MPC votes in period
t, assuming the average historical relationship. We choose the log odds transformation
of q̂t as the dependent variable since Bayes’ rule implies that the log odds of posterior
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beliefs are linear in the log odds of the prior beliefs and log odds of new information.21
We use the fitted values from (4.1) to generate our cleaned proxy variable which we call
q̂MPCt . Specifically, we use the relationship
ln
(
q̂MPCt
1− q̂MPCt
)
= α̂q + β̂q · fMPCt (7)
and back out q̂MPCt . Figure 5 plots q̂
MPC
t and D̂(High Vote)it for all sample periods. One
can see that both proxies take high and low values for both loosening and tightening
cycles.
(a) q̂MPCt
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 P
rio
r P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 th
at
 S
ta
te
 is
 H
ig
h
1997m1 2000m1 2003m1 2006m1 2009m1
Date
(b) D̂(High Vote)it
N
o
Ye
s
D
(V
ote
 H
igh
)
1997m1 2000m1 2003m1 2006m1 2009m1
Date
Internals Externals
Figure 5: Key Empirical Variables
In addition to cleaning q̂t, this transformation has two more advantages. Because we
have voting data every period, it allows us to fill in values for the prior in the periods in
which the Reuters data is missing. Also, as can be seen in figure 5, it reduces the range of
beliefs from [0, 1] (the range of q̂t) to [0.2, 0.8] (the range of q̂
MPC
t ). This aids our maximum
likelihood estimator in separately identifying the σ and θ parameters. Appendix A also
shows that q̂MPCt behaves in ways consistent with the theoretical quantity qt: it strongly
predicts the probability members will vote for the high rate, and has a concave relationship
with the standard deviation of members’ votes. While our baseline results below employ
q̂MPCt , we show in section 6 that they are robust to alternative constructions of prior
beliefs. We also show using Monte Carlo simulations that our estimator is robust to
measurement error in qt.
21We also included a squared term in fMPCt to account for non-linearities in the relationship but these
proved to be insignificant.
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5 Results
This section presents estimates of expertise and philosophy parameters that arise from
maximising the likelihood function (6) by taking22
qt = q̂
MPC
t and
D(High Voteit) = D̂(High Vote)it.
We first apply our estimator to the cross-sectional sample and measure overall differences
between internal and external members. We then explore voting dynamics and show how
expertise and philosophy evolve with tenure. Finally, we analyze whether the possibility
of reappointment leads external members to exaggerate their expertise.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 3 displays the cross-sectional results. Column (1) shows estimates for the the entire
sample (that is, assuming that θit = θ and σit = σ). The average value of σ is 1.24 and of
θ is 0.43. Both values are precisely estimated with fairly tight confidence intervals. The
estimated θ is significantly different from 0.5, meaning the average members has a dovish
philosophy.
Table 3: Estimates of θ and σ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample Internal External Difference
θ 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.35*** -0.17***
[0.41 - 0.45] [0.49 - 0.54] [0.31 - 0.38] [-0.21 - -0.12]
σ 1.24*** 1.72*** 1.03*** -0.69***
[1.12 - 1.35] [1.50 - 1.94] [0.86 - 1.20] [-0.97 - -0.41]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Next, we model θit = αθ + βθD(EXT)i and σit = ασ + βσD(EXT)i where D(EXT)i
is a dummy variable equal one if member i is external. Columns (2) and (3) report the
associated estimated values of σ and θ for internal and external members, and column
(4) reports the differences between them.23 The results are striking and indicate that the
overall sample results mask large heterogeneity between the different member types. We
find that external members have substantially more expertise than internal members. The
22Our estimation is done in Stata and the programs are available on request. In order to facilitate
faster estimation, we actually estimate ln(σi) and ln
(
θi
1−θi
)
and then convert our estimates and standard
errors back appropriately.
23In the preceding tables, the stars indicate that the number is significantly different from zero.
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difference between the estimated σ parameters is −0.69, which is significantly different
from zero at the 1% level. In line with rest of the MPC voting literature, we also find
that external members are more dovish. The average internal member has a neutral
philosophy (θ = 0.51) while the average external member is dovish (θ = 0.35). The
difference is again significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Taken together, these
results predict that external members are less likely to vote for the high rate especially
as qt grows. This can be seen in figure 6, which is the estimated counterpart to figure 3.
At qt = 0.25, both have a predicted 3% chance of voting for the high rate; at qt = 0.5,
the predicted probability that the internal votes for the high rate is 53% while for the
external member it is 0.29; at qt = 0.75, the internal has a 98% chance of voting for the
high rate, while the external member has a 75% chance.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
qt (Prior)
Pr
(v i
t =
 
1)
Estimated Voting Behaviour:
Differences by Type of Member
Externals: θ = 0.35, σ = 1.03
Internals: θ = 0.51, σ = 1.72
Figure 6: The Estimated Probability of Voting for the High Interest Rate
Our findings on the σ differences support the idea that external members bring a
different perspective to the MPC that allows it to “benefit from thinking and expertise in
addition to that gained inside the Bank of England”. Nevertheless, we want to emphasize
that this does not imply that external members have more or better information than
internal members in any absolute sense. Simply put, our estimates indicate that internal
members and market economists form beliefs about inflationary pressures that are closer
together than those of external members and the market. This may be because many City
economists have backgrounds in central banking or because the thinking of the internal
members is the established norm that drives the market’s views.
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One reason that internals and market economists might have similar views is that a
major source of public information produced by the Bank is the Quarterly Inflation Re-
port, which contains forecasts of future inflation. The thinking behind these forecasts may
be driven in large part by the internal members and the staff who produce them. Former
external member David Blanchflower writes that (Bloomberg Businessweek 2010a)
During my time on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, which
makes quarterly economic prognoses, Governor Mervyn King controlled the
hiring and firing of the forecast team, who did his bidding. They had to
produce a result that was consistent with King’s views, or else they would be
history.
While the Bank’s forecast is informative and highly influential, it is also not perfect.
The role of external members is then to add their own views so that the MPC does not
rely solely on the main forecast.24 In other words, the policy conclusion is not that one
should do away with internal members altogether to maximize the available information,
but that one should potentially mix them with externals.
5.2 Voting dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, Hansen and McMahon (2008) show there is evidence
from reduced-form regressions that the average voting difference between internal and
external members grows with time. An advantage of our structural approach is that it
can extend this finding by attributing it to either expertise and philosophy. One might
imagine that external members, being new to monetary policy, might take time to learn
how to read the state of the world and follow the prior (and therefore internal members)
more initially than later. This learning effect would be reflected by similar σ estimates for
new internal and external members, but then lower σ estimates for experienced members.
In order to explore this question, we model our voting parameters as
θit = αθ + β1θ ·D(EXT)i + β2θ ·D(EXP)it + β3θ ·D(EXT)i ·D(EXP)it (8)
σit = ασ + β1σ ·D(EXT)i + β2σ ·D(EXP)it + β3σ ·D(EXT)i ·D(EXP)it (9)
where D(EXP)it is a dummy variable equal to one if member i has served for at least
twelve months on the MPC up to time t. This choice of the twelve month cut-off is
24Although the forecast is “the best collective judgement” of the MPC, in practice it is not always
possible to incorporate all differing views in the central case. As evidence of the fact that not all views
of MPC members are contained in the forecast, the Inflation Report sometimes shows the central case
under some of thse alternative assumptions (Table 6.B of the Inflation Report).
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somewhat arbitrary (it corresponds to 1
3
of the term length for an external member) but
the results are unchanged for thresholds of 9 and 18 months.25
Table 4: MPC Members Distinguished by Experience
(a) σ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Internal External Difference
New 1.91*** 1.08*** -0.83**
[1.29 - 2.53] [0.77 - 1.39] [-1.53 - -0.14]
Experienced 1.70*** 1.23*** -0.47***
[1.46 - 1.94] [0.98 - 1.49] [-0.82 - -0.12]
Difference -0.21 0.15 0.36
[-0.88 - 0.46] [-0.25 - 0.55] [-0.42 - 1.14]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Internal External Difference
New 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.0025
[0.43 - 0.54] [0.42 - 0.55] [-0.080 - 0.085]
Experienced 0.52*** 0.29*** -0.23***
[0.49 - 0.55] [0.26 - 0.33] [-0.27 - -0.18]
Difference 0.037 -0.19*** -0.23***
[-0.025 - 0.098] [-0.26 - -0.12] [-0.32 - -0.14]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows how θ and σ evolve for internal and external members. In terms of the
effect of experience on external members, there is no evidence of learning: the estimated
σ for externals actually grows with time, albeit insignificantly so. Thus it appears that
changes in expertise do not play a large role in voting dynamics. In contrast there are
strong dynamics in θ. Internal and external members begin their time on the MPC with
neutral economic philosophies (both θ estimates are insignificantly different from 0.5)
and internal members remain neutral. On the other hand, the estimated θ coefficient for
experienced external members drops to 0.29. Although our paper focuses on expertise
differences, we view this result as being of independent interest. As external members
gain experience, they become systematically less tough on inflation, indicating that their
later incarnations disagree with the decisions that their earlier selves made.26 Figure 7
shows the effect of experience on the predicted probability that internals and external
vote for the high rate.
It might be tempting to conclude that externals want to blend in at first by mimicking
internal members, but then feel more comfortable contradicting them once they are settled
on the MPC. While this may be true to some extent, we want to highlight that our results
imply that new externals are not afraid of standing out. Even though we measure nearly
the same θ for internals and externals, the fact that they differ in terms of σ means
25Another interesting dimension of the experience analysis is whether the differences we capture are
the effect of being new or of beginning a new term. Unfortunately, there are not enough 2nd or 3rd term
external members for us to carry out the analysis for that group, while for internal members the results
show no differences.
26Note that one cannot generate the result simply by allowing beliefs about θ to evolve as members
refine their view on the transmission mechanism. One would need to add an assumption that new
external members had a prior on θ with an upward bias. Otherwise, by the martingale property, the
average value of θ would remain constant over time.
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Figure 7: The Effect of Experience on Voting Behavior
there is disagreement.27 As we did above, we can calculate, based on the estimated
parameters, the predicted probability that new externals and internals vote for the high
rate for different levels of qt; this gives an indication of the likelihood of disagreement.
When the prior is 0.30 (a 30% chance that the high state of the world prevails), a new
internal member has only a 3% chance of voting for the high rate whereas a new external
has a 15% chance. If qt were 0.7, the new internal would almost certainly vote for the
high rate (94% likely) whereas the new external only votes for the high rate with 83%
probability.
5.3 Voting and reappointment
We conclude our main empirical results by examining a particular type of career concern:
the desire for reappointment to the committee. Appointment to the MPC is undoubtedly
a prestigious position in the UK policy world that brings with it media attention and other
forms of public exposure that are important for building professional stature. One might
well then imagine that members would want to behave in such a way as to maximize the
probability that they are reappointed, or offered reappointment. Since external members
are appointed specifically to bring a fresh perspective to the MPC, and because the
observable behavioral corollary of expertise is voting against the conventional wisdom, it
may be the case that external members are contrarian simply to build a reputation as
27We should note that conflict on the σ dimension is difficult for reduced form regressions to capture
because two members with the same θ will vote on average for the same interest rate even if they differ
in expertise.
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experts rather than because they actually have an informative private viewpoint.
To formalize this idea, one can easily extend the model from section 3. Suppose
that a member has expertise captured by the parameter σ ∈ {σL, σH} that he knows,
while the government only knows that Pr [σ = σL ] = p, and that θ and q are common
knowledge.28 Let R(v) = Pr [σ = σL | v ] be the government’s belief that the member
is the low variance type after observing his vote v. To capture reputational concerns,
suppose that the member’s expected utility from voting for the high rate is now
− (1− θ)(1− ω̂) + βR(1) (10)
and his expected utility from voting for the low rate is
− θω̂ + βR(0), (11)
where β ∈ [0, 1) measures the strength of reputational concerns. Here utility is increasing
in R because we assume that the government is more likely to reappoint external members
whom it believes to have more expertise. The following result shows how the presence of
reputational concerns affects voting behavior.
Proposition 3 There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which a member with
σ = σL chooses v = 1 if and only if s ≥ s∗L(β) and a member with σ = σH chooses v = 1
if and only if s ≥ s∗H(β), where s∗L(β) R s∗H(β) and ∂s
∗
L(β)
∂β
,
∂s∗H(β)
∂β
R 0 as q R 1− θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. Suppose that q > 1− θ and let s∗L(0)
and s∗H(0) be the voting thresholds without career concerns. We know from proposition
2 that s∗H(0) < s
∗
L(0) since the probability that the member with σ = σL votes for the
high rate less often when the prior probability is high. This means that R(0)−R(1) > 0,
so both member types accrue reputation from choosing v = 0. So, when one moves to a
situation in which β > 0, both members have an incentive to vote for 0 more often than
before and so there exists an equilibrium in which s∗L(β) > s
∗
L(0) and s
∗
L(β) > s
∗
L(0).
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In terms of our empirical analysis, proposition 3 makes clear that it is impossible
to distinguish whether we estimate a lower σ parameter for external members than for
internal members because the former genuinely have more expertise or because they want
to signal to the government that they have expertise. Instead we must find an exogenous
source of reputational concerns, which we have in the form of a quasi-natural experiment.
The Act that created the MPC allows for the reappointment of all members, internal and
28Here we drop the it subscripts for notational simplicity.
29A symmetric argument goes through for the case in which q < 1− θ.
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external. When the first group of externals and internals served on the MPC, they would
have operated under the assumption that reappointment to the committee was possible,
although uncertainty still existed about how the reappointment system would function.
Then, on 18 January 2000, Willem Buiter wrote an open letter to then Chancellor Gordon
Brown that laid down forceful arguments for not reappointing external members. To
quote:
With the end of my term approaching, I have given considerable thought
to whether I should be a candidate for re-appointment. I have come to the
conclusion that both the appearance and the substance of independence of the
external members of the MPC are best served by restricting their membership
to a single term - three years as envisaged in the Bank of England Act 1998.
Whether or not this letter swayed Brown’s decision is unclear, but he did not reappoint
a single external member from the original group, even though they included some of
the most prominent macroeconomists in the UK. A clear precedent was set that the
government would be reluctant to reappoint external members. By February 2003 this
view was again modified due to the reappointment of Stephen Nickell. Since then, Kate
Barker has been reappointed twice, and Andrew Sentance has been reappointed once.
In terms of the above model, one can think of the β being lower from February 2000 to
February 2003 for external members than in other periods since the perceived probability
of being reappointed conditional on any voting history was presumably lower. Table
5 tabulates the number of each member’s votes that fall into these eras of lower and
higher reappointment probability. A total of 322 out of 1246 votes lie in the era of lower
reappointment probability and eight internal and external members vote in both eras.
An important insight from the career concerns literature is that reputational incentives
should be expected to vary over time. The most common view is that they should
be strongest at the beginning of the career when there is the most uncertainty about
an agent’s type and when the time horizon over which reputation pays off is relatively
long (Prendergast 1999), but one might also argue that members care more about their
reputations in the periods leading up to reappointment. Regardless, we continue to model
θ and σ as in (8) and (9) to allow for dynamic effects.
Table 6 shows how θ and σ evolve for external members across the different eras.
Column (1) reports the results for February 2000 - February 2003 and column (2) reports
the results for the rest of the sample. In terms of the estimated expertise of new external
members, there is an economically and statistically significant difference across the eras.
When the reappointment probability is lower, the estimated σ is over three times as large
as when it is higher. This is consistent with the view that external members initially
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Table 5: Members Votes by Reappointment Probability
(a) Internals
Votes
Member Low Prob. High Prob.
Davies 0 2
George 36 37
King 36 106
Plenderleith 27 33
Clementi 30 30
Vickers 7 21
Bean 29 73
Tucker 9 73
Large 5 35
Lomax 0 60
Gieve 0 37
Total 179 517
(b) Externals
Votes
Member Low Prob. High Prob.
Buiter 3 33
Goodhart 3 33
Julius 15 30
Budd 0 18
Wadhwani 27 9
Allsopp 33 3
Nickell 33 39
Barker 21 73
Bell 8 28
Lambert 34 0
Walton 0 12
Besley 0 31
Blanchflower 0 34
Sentance 0 30
Total 143 407
exaggerate their private information in order to signal their expertise, and that some of
the estimated expertise difference between internal and external members may not be
driven by actual differences in information at all, but by external career concerns.30
Table 6: External Behavior Across Reappointment Periods
(a) σ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 2.70*** 0.88*** -1.83*
[0.80 - 4.61] [0.53 - 1.22] [-3.76 - 0.11]
Experienced 1.82*** 1.19*** -0.63
[0.93 - 2.71] [0.92 - 1.45] [-1.56 - 0.29]
Difference -0.88 0.31 1.19
[-2.99 - 1.22] [-0.12 - 0.74] [-0.95 - 3.34]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 0.49*** 0.48*** -0.0093
[0.42 - 0.56] [0.39 - 0.57] [-0.12 - 0.10]
Experienced 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.089***
[0.20 - 0.28] [0.29 - 0.37] [0.030 - 0.15]
Difference -0.25*** -0.15*** 0.098
[-0.33 - -0.17] [-0.25 - -0.051] [-0.030 - 0.23]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One validity check on the natural experiment is to examine whether the estimated
expertise for internal members changes across eras in the same way as for external mem-
bers. This would indicate that some common factor made perceiving the state of the
world more difficult for new members during February 2000 - February 2003. Table 7
reveals that in fact there are no such differences for internal members. If anything, their
initial variance is lower from February 2000 - February 2003 than in other periods. The
astute reader will notice that the estimated value of σ for experienced external members is
30The estimated variance for experienced external members is also higher in the era of lower reap-
pointment probability, but this difference is not statistically significant. External members also show
higher variance in February 2000 - February 2003 in the cross section, but again the difference is not
significant.
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nearly the same as for experienced internals from February 2000 - February 2003. Rather
than interpret this result as evidence that career concerns explain the entire measured
σ difference in the baseline, we believe it is an anomaly generated from the restricted
sample. It is not robust to alternative specifications of the prior belief (although the
column difference in table 6 is). Also, the votes undertaken by external members in this
period are cast disproportionately by non-academics, who as we show below tend to have
a higher estimated σ.
Table 7: Internal Behavior Across Reappointment Periods
(a) σ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 1.59*** 2.08*** 0.49
[0.48 - 2.70] [1.24 - 2.91] [-0.90 - 1.87]
Experienced 1.93*** 1.64*** -0.28
[1.34 - 2.51] [1.38 - 1.91] [-0.92 - 0.36]
Difference 0.34 -0.43 -0.77
[-0.92 - 1.59] [-1.31 - 0.45] [-2.30 - 0.76]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 0.57*** 0.46*** -0.11
[0.44 - 0.71] [0.40 - 0.52] [-0.26 - 0.036]
Experienced 0.56*** 0.50*** -0.056*
[0.51 - 0.61] [0.47 - 0.54] [-0.11 - 0.0027]
Difference -0.014 0.041 0.055
[-0.16 - 0.13] [-0.029 - 0.11] [-0.10 - 0.21]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although the expert career concerns literature has focused primarily on the signaling
of expertise, table 6 also reveals a correlation between the size of the fall in θ and the
probability of reappointment. When the probability is higher, the magnitude of the fall
is 0.17 and when it is lower the magnitude is 0.32. One might imagine that external
members would not be reappointed if the government believed that their philosophy was
too extreme in either a dovish or hawkish direction, so that those with career concerns
remained more neutral than their colleagues that cared less about reappointment.31
Occupational background also provides a source of heterogeneity for career concerns.32
Since the most important activity that academic research economists carry out is the pro-
duction of basic research, external academics may not care as much about reappointment
as external non-academics since recommencing an active research career is substantially
more difficult after six years than after three. The fact that academics do not face future
31Some basic support for this view comes from the fact that the percentage of votes that an external
member makes that deviate upward from the committee decision positively and significantly predicts the
probability he will get reappointed, and the percentage of votes made that deviate downward from the
committee decision negatively (but insignificantly) predicts the probability.
32We have also tried to examine whether the age of the member captures any of the estimated differ-
ences but we find no differences in the behavior of either internal or external members when they are
older or younger (we tried a number of different cutoffs). While one might think that younger members
have more reputation to build, and the payoffs from such reputation would be enjoyed over the longer
period remaining in their careers, it is not clear whether any differences between, for example, a 50 year
old member and a 60 year old member, would be large enough to identify.
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occupational uncertainty is a further reason why their reputational incentives may be
lower.
Table 8 shows how θ and σ evolve for external academics and non-academics. When
new, both academic and non-academic externals have an estimated σ near one. While
academics maintain this level of expertise, non-academics actually have a significant de-
crease in their expertise, which is again consistent with the idea that the desire for
reappointment influences behavior. This result also suggests that academic members
have more expertise than non-academic members in general. Academic externals also
display a significantly larger fall in θ than non-academic externals. This gives additional
evidence for the idea that reputational concerns may limit the extent to which external
members are willing to exhibit philosophical differences with internal members.
Table 8: The Behavior of External Members by D(Academic)
(a) σ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Non-academic Academic Difference
New 1.18*** 1.00*** -0.18
[0.76 - 1.59] [0.52 - 1.47] [-0.81 - 0.46]
Experienced 1.75*** 0.92*** -0.83***
[1.22 - 2.28] [0.60 - 1.23] [-1.45 - -0.21]
Difference 0.57* -0.080 -0.65
[-0.10 - 1.25] [-0.65 - 0.49] [-1.54 - 0.23]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Non-academic Academic Difference
New 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.080
[0.37 - 0.53] [0.43 - 0.63] [-0.047 - 0.21]
Experienced 0.31*** 0.25*** -0.061
[0.28 - 0.35] [0.19 - 0.32] [-0.14 - 0.015]
Difference -0.14*** -0.28*** -0.14*
[-0.22 - -0.052] [-0.40 - -0.16] [-0.29 - 0.0065]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of the estimates presented in section 5. We
address three main concerns. First, since correctly measuring the prior distribution is
crucial for our results, we explore the effect of using alternative constructions and how our
estimator performs with measurement error in beliefs. Second, we discuss why we have not
allowed for individual heterogeneity and whether our estimator can accurately measure
between-group differences in the presence of heterogeneity. Finally, we ask whether all
Bank outsiders necessarily bring strong private information.
6.1 Alternative constructions of the prior
The main estimation difficulty is that we do not observe the qt variable which captures
the prior belief that the correct interest rate is the high interest rate. The baseline
measure that we use involves combining two proxies for the information that the MPC
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has available when it makes its decision; this is our q̂MPCt variable. While we believe that
we have pursued a reasonable approach to calculating this variable, we also acknowledge
that it remains an imperfect measure. In order to address this concern, we explore two
avenues.
Table 9: Different Approaches to Calculating the Prior Distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
q̂MPCt 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.8 1246
q̂MPCit 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.8 1246
q̂MPCt (02 - 09) 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.9 685
q̂TIMESt (02 - 09) 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.9 685
The first is to explore alternative proxy constructions. As mentioned in section 2,
members spend over a day in discussions prior to voting. During this time members
share their views with each other, allowing their colleagues to update their beliefs on
the likelihood of various economic shocks. q̂MPCt does not capture this effect because it
attributes to every member a common prior. In order to tackle this, we fit a member-
specific prior belief q̂MPCit using the estimated coefficient values from equation (4.1):
ln
(
q̂MPCit
1− q̂MPCit
)
= α̂q + β̂q · fMPCit , (12)
where fMPCit is the share of votes in time t for the high rate excluding the vote of member
i. This is a measure of the extent to which the information that member i receives from
other members favors the high rate. Our construction assumes that committee members
update their beliefs in response to fMPCit in the same way the market’s beliefs would
update if it could observe fMPCt . We find that all our baseline results are robust to this
measure of beliefs. Here we only report the results related to our central findings. As
one can see in table 10a, we continue to find that external members have significantly
more private information than internals. Tables 10b and 10c report estimates for our
quasi-natural experiment, and the crucial finding, namely that new external members
seeking reappointment appear to exaggerate expertise again arises. In the period of
higher reappointment probability, experienced externals are also measured to have a
smaller dovish shift.
As we mentioned previously, a worry about the Reuter’s survey is that it measures
beliefs about what the MPC will decide rather than what respondents feel should be
done. Rather than use the actual MPC votes to purge q̂t of noise, a better method may
be to use another source of information in which experts predict what should be done.
We do this by using voting data from the Times MPC, a committee of experts—many
of whom are former or future MPC members—that votes monthly on interest rates as
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Table 10: Robustness of our Key Results to Individual Specific Priors
(a) Baseline Estimates - q̂MPCit
(1) (2) (3)
Internal External Difference
θ 0.52*** 0.30*** -0.22***
[0.49 - 0.55] [0.25 - 0.36] [-0.28 - -0.16]
σ 1.42*** 0.73*** -0.69***
[1.24 - 1.59] [0.58 - 0.88] [-0.92 - -0.46]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) σ Estimates - q̂MPCit
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 1.93*** 0.53*** -1.41**
[0.89 - 2.98] [0.16 - 0.90] [-2.51 - -0.30]
Experienced 0.98*** 0.89*** -0.090
[0.43 - 1.54] [0.68 - 1.11] [-0.69 - 0.50]
Difference -0.95 0.36* 1.31**
[-2.13 - 0.23] [-0.069 - 0.79] [0.059 - 2.57]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(c) θ Estimates - q̂MPCit
(1) (2) (3)
Reappointment Probability
Low High Difference
New 0.50*** 0.47*** -0.023
[0.42 - 0.58] [0.29 - 0.66] [-0.22 - 0.18]
Experienced 0.17*** 0.30*** 0.13**
[0.087 - 0.26] [0.24 - 0.35] [0.023 - 0.23]
Difference -0.32*** -0.17* 0.15
[-0.44 - -0.20] [-0.37 - 0.016] [-0.076 - 0.37]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
part of a monthly feature for the Times of London newspaper. We construct q̂TIMESt by
again running a regression as in (4.1), but replace fMPCt with the fraction of Times MPC
members that vote for the high rate. Unfortunately, the Times MPC only began meeting
November 2002, so using it means we lose many observations and cannot replicate our
natural experiment. In order to compare like with like, we also regenerate our original
q̂MPCt variable on the November 2002 - March 2009 subsample.
Table 11: Robustness to the Times MPC measure
q̂MPCt : 2002− 2009 Sample q̂TIMESt : 2002− 2009 Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Internal External Difference Internal External Difference
θ 0.39*** 0.22*** -0.17*** 0.36*** 0.19*** -0.18***
[0.35 - 0.43] [0.18 - 0.26] [-0.22 - -0.11] [0.33 - 0.39] [0.11 - 0.26] [-0.26 - -0.091]
σ 1.58*** 1.02*** -0.57*** 1.29*** 0.70*** -0.60***
[1.31 - 1.85] [0.80 - 1.23] [-0.91 - -0.22] [1.07 - 1.52] [0.47 - 0.92] [-0.92 - -0.27]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11 shows that our baseline results hold up when we clean q̂t with the Times
MPC voting data rather than the MPC voting data. Externals’ private information and
dovish philosophy strongly distinguish them from internal members.33
33We could of course use q̂t itself to estimate the model. The problem is that when we reduce its
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The second approach to account for measurement error in q̂MPCt is to see whether our
estimator can recover the true underlying parameters in Monte Carlo simulations when
we give it noisy measures of qt. Appendix C shows that it still performs well in the sense
of generating biases that are small both in expected value and absolute value.
6.2 Individual heterogeneity
In our analysis, we have not included member fixed effects for two main reasons. The
first is that, as we make use of a probit-type estimation, inclusion of fixed-effects is
potentially problematic in such a framework (Baltagi 2005). Second, we are interested
in the contribution of the average external and internal member to the MPC and not
heterogeneity among individual members. While we accept that the θ and σ parameters
may differ at the level of individual members, member fixed effects would soak up the
variation that we are interested in. We would therefore need to calculate member-specific
estimates and then examine the distribution of these member-specific parameters by
internal and external grouping. The problem with this approach is that many external
members have not served for long periods, and our likelihood estimator is unable to
converge in many cases. The approach we pursue above means that we can draw on
statistical power from the fact that we have over 500 external member votes and over 600
internal member votes.
Nevertheless, one still may be concerned that individual heterogeneity manifests itself
in the form of biased estimates when we impose the restriction of a common θ and σ. In
order to address these concerns, we use Monte Carlo simulations to study the properties
of our estimator when there is individual heterogeneity in both parameters. Under these
conditions, our estimator produces an accurate estimate of the difference in group means
between internals and externals, which is the main quantity of interest in our paper. Thus
unmodelled individual heterogeneity does not appear to be of great concern. Full details
of the approach and results are in appendix C.
6.3 Externals versus outsiders
External members on the MPC in fact have two distinguishing characteristics. First,
they are not selected from the staff of the central bank; second, they do not become Bank
executives when they join the MPC. One might wonder the extent to which this second
feature matters for the differences we find. In order to shed light on this issue, we make use
range to [0.2, 0.8] through dropping data we lose around 40% of our sample and covergence is difficult
to achieve in some cases. Nevertheless, we can estimate the cross-sectional results, and externals again
have a highly significant difference from internals in terms of private information.
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of the fact that internal members contain a number of people who were not previously
employed by the Bank of England prior to their joining the MPC (in contrast to the
external outsiders, these internals also become part of the Bank of England Executive
Team and thus are Bank employees and have management responsibilities within the
Bank). These members are Clementi, Vickers, Bean, Large, Lomax and Gieve. This
is similar to the situation on the FOMC, which has had many outside experts who are
appointed to the Federal Reserve staff (either the Board of Governors or a regional Fed).
Table 12: Estimates of θ and σ for Bank Insiders and Bank Outsiders
(1) (2) (3)
Outsider Insider Difference
θ 0.50*** 0.53*** 0.032
[0.46 - 0.54] [0.50 - 0.57] [-0.023 - 0.086]
σ 1.33*** 1.53*** 0.19
[1.10 - 1.57] [1.26 - 1.79] [-0.16 - 0.55]
95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12 shows that there are no significant differences in either philosophy or expertise
between “inside” and “outside” internal members. This is not proof that not being Bank
employees is important for the behavioral differences we observe for external members
because it may be that outside experts similar to central bankers are more likely to be
selected as internal members. If this is the case, table 12 shows that not just any type
of outsider brings new information to the table—it is only outsiders with truly different
backgrounds who do. On the other hand, it may be that some institutional conditioning
affects the behavior of internal members. For example, internals members may be less
contrarian to avoid offending the staff they manage who produce the pre-MPC analysis.34
7 Conclusion
This paper makes two significant contributions to the literature on expert decision mak-
ing. The first is methodological. We show how one can separately identify an expert’s
philosophy (or preferences) from his private information using voting data and a measure
of the public’s beliefs about the realization of an unknown state variable. This same
approach could potentially be used in a variety of situations. The second, arguably more
important one, is that this is the first paper, to the best of our knowledge, to show that
external experts bring private information to a committee. This finding not only backs
34This is a counter point to Blinder (2007b), who argues that the optimal monetary policy committee
should be composed solely of government employees.
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up the view of the Bank of England, but also supports their inclusion in other technical
decision-making bodies.
At the same time, the findings are not unambiguously positive. Most notably, we find
evidence that externals may exaggerate the information to gain reappointment, and to
the extent that they engage in this behavior, they distort the final decision. However,
reputational incentives are endogenous to the design of the committee. For example,
if the possibility of reappointment leads to a behavioral distortion, the UK government
could amend the Bank of England Act to include a one-term limit for external members
or else seek to appoint more academic members. Our results show that these decisions
should be carefully considered along with the decision about whether to include external
members. Another potential strike against external members is that they have different
philosophies than internal members, and depending on the preferred approach of the
committee designer, this may harm welfare. On the MPC, for example, the government
may consider externals too soft on inflation.35 In this sense, allowing for reappointment
may be a double-edged sword: it can both lead to information exaggeration (which lowers
welfare) but also help enforce a neutral philosophy (which raises welfare, assuming that
the government favors a neutral position).
In spite of these concerns, the paper shows that a mixed committee structure can
indeed expand the information available to a group when it comes to take a decision,
and this broadly favors the appointment of externals. The challenge for future research
is to determine how best to draw on their information while minimizing other potential
welfare losses arising from their inclusion.
35The FDA has also recently been criticized for bringing new drugs onto the market too quickly, which
may be a result of outside experts having a lower burden of proof for drug safety than the government.
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A Reuter’s Survey Data
As described above, the Reuters Data that we have been able to gather is divided into
three segments corresponding to data availability, and each period calls for a different
construction methodology. Implicit in the construction is how we define D̂(High Vote)it.
June 1997 - June 1998: Mark I Construction
We have modal data, all of which takes a value of 0, and +25, except for October 1997
in which one bank reported +50 which we treat as +25.
• q̂t is computed as the total number of reports for +25 over the total number of
reports.
• Anomalies
– In the May 1998 MPC meeting there were 6 votes for no change, 1 vote for
-25 (Julius) and 1 vote for +25 (Buiter). We treat the -25 vote as a low vote
and proceed as above.
– In the June 1998 MPC meeting there were 8 votes for +25 and 1 vote for -25
(Julius). Again, we treat -25 as a low vote.
July 1998 - December 2001: Mark II Construction
We have partial probability distribution data over rise, no change, and cut. In some
periods only two of these three options are available.
• First we compute the average probability placed on rise, cut, and no change.
• For all periods in which the observe votes that lie in the set -25,0,25 we treat the
data as if the probability of rise is the probability of +25 and the probability of cut
is the probability of -25.
• For periods in which the votes are +25 and 0 we construct q̂t as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0.
• For periods in which the votes are 0 and -25 we construct q̂t as the total average
probability put on 0 over the total average probability placed on 0 and -25.
• For periods in which all votes are for +25 we construct q̂t over the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0.
• For periods in which all votes are for -25 we construct q̂t over the total average
probability put on 0 over the total average probability placed on 0 and -25.
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• For periods in which all votes are for nochange we construct q̂t as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0 if the
total average probability placed on +25 is larger than the total average probability
placed on -25, and construct q̂t as the total average probability put on 0 over the
total average probability placed on 0 and -25 if the total average probability placed
on -25 is larger than the total average probability placed on +25.
• Anomalies
– In August 1998 there were 7 votes for no change, 1 vote for -25 (Julius) and 1
vote for 25 (Buiter). The total average probability placed on +25 is 0.39 and
the total average probability placed on -25 is 0.001. So we treat +25 as high
vote and compute as the total average probability place on +25.
– In January 1999 there was one vote for no change (Plenderleith), 7 votes for
-25, and one vote for -50 (Julius). We treat the vote for -25 and -50 as low
votes and compute q̂t as the total average probability placed on nochange over
the total average probability placed on nochange and cut.
– In March 1999 8 people voted for nochange and 1 person (Buiter) voted for
-40. We treat the -40 vote as a vote for -25 and proceed as above.
– In April 2000 3 people voted for +25 and six for 0, but Reuters survey does
not ask for probability of rise. We treat these data as missing in this period.
– In January 2000 the votes were over +25 and +50 and we set q̂t = 0.5.
– In April 2001, May 2001, October 2001, and November 2001, the votes were
over -25 and -50 and we set q̂t = 0.5.
January 2002 - March 2009: Mark III Construction
We have full distribution data over +50, +25, 0, -25, -50.
• First we compute the average probability placed on +50, +25, no change, -25 and
-50.
• For periods in which there are two unique votes we take q̂t as the total average
probability placed on the higher of the two votes over the total average probability
placed on both votes.
• For periods in which all votes are for +50 we construct q̂t over the total average
probability put on +50 over the total average probability placed on +50 and +25.
• For periods in which all votes are for -50 we construct q̂t over the total average
probability put on -25 over the total average probability placed on -25 and -50.
35
• For periods in which all votes are for nochange we construct q̂t as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0 if the
total average probability placed on +25 is larger than the total average probability
placed on -25, and construct q̂t as the total average probability put on 0 over the
total average probability placed on 0 and -25 if the total average probability placed
on -25 is larger than the total average probability placed on +25.
• We follow a similar procedure as the above for periods in which all votes are for
+25 or -25.
• Anomalies
– In May 2006 there were six votes for no change, one vote for +25 (Walton)
and one vote for -25 (Nickell). The market put probability 0.08 on -25 and
probability 0.03 on +25. So we take 0 to be high vote and compute q̂t as
(meannochange + meanrise25)/(meancut25 + meannochange + meanrise25).
– In April 2008 there were votes for 0, -25, and -50. We take 0 as a high-
vote and -25 and -50 as low votes, and compute the high vote as (mean-
nochange)/(meancut25 + meannochange + meancut50).
– In August 2008 there were votes over -25, 0, +25 but the market placed roughly
equal probability on -25 and +25 so we set q̂t as missing.
– In November 2008 there was unanimity on -150 and we set q̂t as missing.
– From December 2008 - March 2009 we again have modal data.
∗ In December 2008 everyone vote to cut -100 and -100 was the lower bound
on the modes. We set -100 as low vote and compute q̂t as all modes not
equal to -100 over all modes.
∗ In January 2009 everyone votes to cut by -50 or -100 and these make up
most modes. We set q̂t as the number of -50 modes over all modes equal
to -50 or -100.
∗ In February 2009 everyone votes to cut -50 or -100. We take q̂t as the
total number of modes not equal to -100 over the total number of modes.
∗ In March 2009 everyone votes to cut -50. We set -50 as the high vote and
set q̂t as all modes -50 or greater over all modes.
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A.1 Consistency of constructed beliefs
As discussed in section 4.1, we use the fitted values from (4.1) to generate our main
proxy variable for the common prior. Here, we verify that our empirical measure of
beliefs behaves in a way consistent with its theoretical counterpart—the unobserved qt.
To this end, we first estimate A.1 via a probit model in order to uncover the correlation
between q̂MPCt and D̂(Vote High)it. A reasonable requirement for our data is that ψ1 be
positive. As reported in table A.1a, this check is successfully passed.
D̂(Vote High)it = α + ψ1 · q̂MPCt (A.1)
Our second consistency check concerns the relationship between q̂MPCt and the within-
period variability of votes. As the decision becomes more certain (qt → 0 or qt → 1),
the standard deviation of votes within a period should decline; this predicted inverted-U
shape relationship can be explored using equation A.2. As reported in table A.1b, we
find the predicted relationship.
Std Deviation of Votest = α + ψ1 · q̂MPCt + ψ2 ·
(
q̂MPCt
)2
+ εit (A.2)
Table A.1: Checks on the Behavior of the Prior:
Estimates of Equation (A.1) and (A.2)
(a) Probability of voting for the
high interest rate
(1)
D(High Vote)
q̂t 5.89***
[0.24]
Constant -3.24***
[0.15]
Observations 1246
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) Voting dispersion
(1)
Std. Dev. Votest
¯̂qt 1.57***
[0.086]
¯̂qt
2
-1.48***
[0.079]
Constant -0.26***
[0.021]
Observations 142
R-squared 0.643
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose that q < 1 − θ. The member votes for the high rate if and only if
ω̂ ≥ (1− θ) + βD where D = R(1)−R(0). If the evaluator believes that the type σ = σi
expert uses the voting threshold s∗i , then
D(s∗L, s
∗
H) =
pPr [ sL ≥ s∗L ]
pPr [ sL ≥ s∗L ] + (1− p) Pr [ sH ≥ s∗H ]
−
pPr [ sL < s
∗
L ]
pPr [ sL < s∗L ] + (1− p) Pr [ sH < s∗H ]
. (B.1)
Letting s′i denote the optimal threshold for type σi, one obtains
s′i =
1
2
− σ2i ln
(
θ −D(s∗L, s∗H)
1− θ +D(s∗L, s∗H)
1
1− q
)
(B.2)
which implies that
s′L =
σL
σH
(
s′H −
1
2
)
+
1
2
. (B.3)
Note that s′H > s
′
L whenever s
′
H >
1
2
and s′H = s
′
L when s
′
H =
1
2
. An equilibrium exists if
one can find a s∗H for which
s∗H =
1
2
− σ2H ln
(
θ − F (s∗H)
1− θ + F (s∗L, s∗H)
1
1− q
)
(B.4)
where
F = β

pPr
[
sL≥ σLσH (s
∗
H− 12)+ 12
]
pPr
[
sL≥ σLσH (s
∗
H− 12)+ 12
]
+(1−p) Pr [ sH≥s∗H ]
−
pPr
[
sL<
σL
σH
(s∗H− 12)+ 12
]
pPr
[
sL<
σL
σH
(s∗H− 12)+ 12
]
+(1−p) Pr [ sH≥s∗H ]
 . (B.5)
If s∗H =
1
2
− σ2H ln
(
θ
1−θ
1
1−q
)
> 1
2
, the LHS of (B.4) is bigger than the RHS since (B.5)
> 0; if s∗H =
1
2
, the LHS is smaller than the RHS since (B.5) = 0. Since (B.4) is continuous
in s∗H , by the intermediate value theorem there exists some s
∗
H ∈ (12 , 12 − σ2H ln
(
θ
1−θ
1
1−q
)
)
where (B.4) is satisfied and at which 1
2
< s∗L < s
∗
H .
Now consider an expert with career concerns given by β′ > β. If s∗H(β
′) = s∗H(β),
then the LHS of (B.4) is bigger than the RHS since F is now bigger than before. Just
as before, if s∗H =
1
2
, the LHS of (B.4) is smaller than the RHS since (B.5) = 0. So there
exists some equilibrium threshold s∗H(β
′) ∈ (1
2
, s∗H(β)) implying the existence of some
equilibrium threshold s∗L(β
′) ∈ (1
2
, s∗L(β)). A symmetric argument holds for q > 1− θ.
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C Monte Carlo Exercise
In this appendix we describe the Monte Carlo exercise that we carry out to explore the
robustness of our estimation approach to both measurement error in our proxy for the
unobserved prior and individual heterogeneity.
C.1 Design and Implementation
The first test of our estimator (Case 1 below) is to determine its performance when we
perfectly observe the prior distribution and internal and external members are homoge-
neous. In order to do this, we use our model to generate a dataset with 1350 observations
with 11 internal members (serving 80 meetings each) and 12 external members (serving
50 meetings each), a division that roughly mimics our sample. We attribute to internal
members θInt = 0.5 and σInt = 1.7 and to external members θExt = 0.35 and σExt = 1. To
generate the jth vote of individual i, we first draw qij from a U [0.2, 0.8] distribution; then
ωij ∈ {0, 1} from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter qij36; then sij from a N(ωij, σ2i )
distribution; finally, vij is determined by the voting rule derived in section 3. We then
run our estimator, with the correct values of qij and vij, and generate estimates for σInt,
θInt, σExt, and θExt. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times.
In Case 2 we generate the dataset exactly as above, but rather than use the true value
of qij in the estimation, we use the variable q
′
ij = qij + ηij where qij ∼ U [0.25, 0.75] and
ηit ∼ N(0, (0.15)2). This implies that the value of q′ij has a 96% probability of taking a
value in the range [0.2, 0.8]; whenever it takes a value outside that range we drop it from
the estimation due to the difficulties described in section 4.
In Case 3 we draw a θ and σ parameter for each individual in our sample. For internal
(external) members, we draw θ from a U [0.45, 0.55] (U [0.2, 0.5]) distribution and σ from
a U [1.4, 2.0] (U [0.6, 1.4]) distribution and generate a dataset exactly as in Case 1. We
then run our estimator under the restriction that θ and σ are constant within the group
of internals and externals.
For each case we are interested in how far away the estimated values of σInt, θInt,
σExt, and θExt are from their true values. In Case 3 we define σInt =
1
11
∑11
1 σi where i
corresponds to the ith internal members. We apply similar definitions to the other three
parameters of interest. For each of the 1,000 replications of each case, we calculate the
36Notice that we draw a new state variable for each vote and thus do not construct a time series
dimension; this should not effect the estimates in any systematic way and simplifies the programming.
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Table C.1: Parameter Values for the Monte Carlo Exercises
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Baseline Noisy Prior Member Variation
Internal External Internal External Internal External
θ 0.5 0.35 0.5 0.35 0.45-0.55 0.2-0.5
σ 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.4-2.0 0.6-1.4
qMt qt qt + ηit qt
where: ηit ∼ N(0, (0.15)2)
following biases:
Bias[σ̂Int] = σInt − σ̂Int
Bias[σ̂Ext] = σExt − σ̂Ext
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] = (σInt − σ̂Int)− (σExt − σ̂Ext)
Bias[θ̂Int] = θInt − θ̂Int
Bias[θ̂Ext] = θExt − θ̂Ext
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] = (θInt − θ̂Int)− (θExt − θ̂Ext)
C.2 Results
For each case, we report in Table C.2 the mean bias as well as select points in the
distribution of the biases over the 1,000 replications (we use the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th
and 90th percentiles). Introducing noise in the measurement of the prior, or individual
heterogeneity for which our estimator does not account, has a negligible effect on the
point estimates of parameters or the differences between internal and external members.
It certainly appears that the estimates of the σ parameters are somewhat more sensitive
to the precision of the underlying data than the θ estimates. Nonetheless, the effect
of both additions is small on the σ parameter estimates. To give some context to the
numbers, note that our estimated difference between internal and external expertise in
section 5 was −0.7 and the tenth percentile in the bias is only −0.13 for case 2 and −0.14
for case 3.
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Table C.2: Results of the Monte Carlo Exercises
Variable Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Case 1
Bias[σ̂Int] 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.15
Bias[σ̂Ext] 0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.00 0.08 0.14
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] 0.00 -0.19 -0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.21
Bias[θ̂Int] 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.03
Case 2
Bias[σ̂Int] -0.06 -0.20 -0.14 -0.06 0.01 0.08
Bias[σ̂Ext] -0.12 -0.26 -0.19 -0.12 -0.05 0.02
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] 0.06 -0.13 -0.05 0.05 0.16 0.24
Bias[θ̂Int] -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07
Case 3
Bias[σ̂Int] -0.04 -0.17 -0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.11
Bias[σ̂Ext] -0.09 -0.24 -0.17 -0.09 -0.02 0.05
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] 0.06 -0.14 -0.05 0.05 0.17 0.25
Bias[θ̂Int] 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05
41
